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1.1. Historical development
Since launching its open door policy in 1978, the Chinese government has continued to reform the corpo-
rate policies of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and has improved connections between the state economy and
the market economy. As SOEs are a substantial part of the national economy and of government revenue, the
Chinese government has gradually privatized SOEs to raise funds for expansions and to increase eﬃciency.
The history of this gradual transformation of Chinese SOEs is summarized in Table 1.
Most Chinese listed ﬁrms were established through the privatization of SOEs. To maintain their dominant
position, equity in listed ﬁrms is divided into A-shares, B-shares, H-shares, state-owned shares, institutional
shares, employee shares and other shares, but only A-, B- and H-shares can be freely traded. A- and B-shares
are generally traded on two domestic stock exchanges whereas H-shares are traded on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. Before the share reform1 of 2005, state shares could not be traded on any stock exchange (i.e., they
were non-tradable shares). Table 2 illustrates the percentage of state-owned shares from 2001 to 2007. The
average percentage of state-owned shares between 2001 and 2005 (before the share reform) was approximately
46.5% of the total shares but the percentage of state-owned shares decreased to 26.9% in 2007.
1.2. Motivation of the study
Traditional SOEs were initially ideological organizations created as work units (gongzuo danwei) to serve
social and political purposes rather than to meet economic objectives. The primary stakeholders of SOEs were
public oﬃcials, government bureaucrats and top managers appointed to run the SOEs, who enjoyed the same
privileges as state cadres (guojia ganbu). Secondary stakeholders were the SOEs’ workers, who expected an
‘iron rice bowl’ (tiefanwan) with cradle-to-grave beneﬁts (Hua et al., 2006).
State ownership is widely viewed as, and has been repeatedly demonstrated to be, ineﬃcient (Boycko et al.,
1995). Both the proﬁt motives and the political motives of government oﬃcials have the potential to signiﬁ-
cantly distort objective policy (Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2003). Recognizing these potential problems, the
Chinese government has been gradually privatizing its SOEs, either through management buyouts or by going
public (i.e., by listing them on the Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets).
1.2.1. Reform of state-owned enterprises (zhuada fangxiao policy)
The early economic reform that introduced the price system and proﬁt incentives to SOEs did not signif-
icantly improve their performance. Consequently, President Jiang Zemin announced the zhuada fangxiao pol-
icy (grasp the large, release the small) at the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress in 1997. Under this policy,
the central government retained ownership of SOEs that (1) produce defence goods and services, (2) are in
industrial sectors targeted for economic development or (3) are insolvent, but employed millions of employ-
ees.2 The central government decided that the state should withdraw from the competitive sectors of the
national economy and only concentrate on strategic industries. The zhuada fangxiao strategy was therefore
announced as the guiding principle for SOE reform, which after various experiments at local levels has been
interpreted as privatizing all but the largest SOEs controlled by the central government or the central SOEs
(Leng, 2009).1 Before the share reform, state-owned and legal person shares (normally including those shares held by the largest shareholders) were
non-tradable on any stock exchange. The share reform involved a capital reorganization that converted non-tradable shares into tradable
ones.
2 Extracted from the report ‘Five challenges that China must overcome to sustain economic growth’, released by the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress in July 2006. Available from the website: http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~hmlien/social%20insur-
ance%20in%20china/paper/FIVE%20CHALLENGES%20THAT%20CHINA%20MUST%20OVERCOME.pdf, accessed 27 July 2012.
Table 1
The reform process and its results for Chinese SOEs.
Reformation
time
1978–1985 1986–1991 1992–2002 2003-Present
Main content Decision-making rights
delegated to factory directors
who make proﬁts from the
SOEs
Management
responsibility
system
Modern corporate system;
‘corporatization’ introduced,
reform enacted and laws
strengthened
Establishment of State-owned
Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission
Expanded management
autonomy
Separation of
ownership and
management
authority
Enhanced supervision and
service of state-owned assets
Results Performance evaluation Short-term
performance
focus
Despite some achievements,
ownership of state-owned
assets is still an issue
Emphasis on the core political
role of the Chinese Communist
Party in the corporate
governance system
No corporate governance
system in place; lack of
external environment needed
for reform.
Excessive
government
administration
Increased
corruption
Adopted from Cho and Huang (2010).
Table 2
Share ownership (2001–2007).
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
State-owned shares 241,061 277,343 304,653 334,420 343,334 458,821 603,388
Other non-tradable shares 99,423 106,512 111,423 122,805 128,140 350,773 610,441
Total non-tradable shares 340,484 383,855 416,076 457,25 471,474 809,594 1,213,829
Tradable shares 181,317 203,690 226,770 257,718 291,477 683,041 1,033,149
Total shares 521,801 587,545 642,846 714,943 762,951 1,492,635 2,246,978
Percentage of state-owned shares 46.2% 47.2% 47.4% 46.8% 45.0% 30.7% 26.9%
Unit: Million shares.
Extracted from the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2008 Almanac of Chinese Listed Companies, Table 7 – Capital Structure
Figures (1992–2007).
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Chinese scholars (e.g., Leng, 2009; Wang, 2010) have described the current policy as zhuada fangxiao, in
which central SOEs are subject to a ‘grasp the large’ (zhuada) scheme in which the state owner retains control.
Local SOEs are managed under the ‘release the small’ (fangxiao) scheme, aimed at introducing foreign and
private capital and creating more complete privatization (Leng, 2009).
According to Leng (2009), in July 2007 there were 155 large SOEs owned and directly controlled by the
central government, and these SOEs were generally in strategic sectors and industries such as oil, telecommu-
nications, civil aviation, highway, steel and power. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) took actions to implement a strategy of ‘grasping the large’ (zhuada) aimed at building
the global competitiveness of the central SOEs. The major schemes adopted by the SASAC to implement the
zhuada strategy include:
 encouraging industrial rationalization to achieve operational integration and capacity expansion;
 introducing competition to state monopolies in strategic sectors;
 consolidating ‘core business lines’ and decoupling ancillary operations; and
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The mandate of the SASAC is to represent the state owner in China’s largest SOEs under central gov-
ernment control (central SOEs), with a primary responsibility for maintaining and increasing the value of
state assets in these ﬁrms. In June 2003, local governments were granted the de facto ownership rights to
local SOEs. This means that local governments now enjoy the status of owners of the state assets under
their control and have the right to transfer or auction oﬀ these assets and to make personnel decisions
in local SOEs without ﬁrst having to obtain approval from central government (Leng, 2009), i.e., the fan-
gxiao policy. For Chinese state-owned small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are usually controlled
by local governments, corporate governance reform has gradually been taking place and some meaningful
results have been achieved (Leng, 2009). Through ownership restructuring guided by the fangxiao policy,
the majority of Chinese state-owned SMEs have been privatized by insiders, including former managers
and employees, and consequently some state-owned SMEs are now under the control of their respective
local governments. Nevertheless, Wang and Xiao (2009) argue that local governments have a strong incen-
tive to impose policies on the ﬁrms under their control, especially when they are experiencing ﬁscal
diﬃculties.1.2.3. Establishment of the state-assets management system
SOEs are considered to be owned by the Chinese people but managed by politicians, resulting in a typical
agency problem, i.e., the separation of ownership and control. For administrative purposes, certain SOEs,
particularly the largest ones (hereinafter central SOEs), are under the supervision of central government ele-
ments including the State Council, its ministries and the SASAC. In contrast, many smaller SOEs (hereinafter
local SOEs) are under the supervision of local governments and their respective SASACs. Under current pol-
icy,3 both the central government and the various local governments are presumed to exercise investors’ rights
on behalf of the state. Both central and local SOEs further spilt this structure when they undertake IPOs, i.e.,
by forming central state-controlled listed ﬁrms (hereinafter central SCLFs) and local state-controlled listed
ﬁrms (hereinafter local SCLFs). Examples of the organizational structures of these two types of listed ﬁrms
are set out in the following diagram.
SASAC, State Council
(ultimate shareholder)
100%
Overseas Chinese Town Co Ltd
(controlling shareholder)
(central SOE)
31.31%
Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Co 
Ltd (Stock code: 000069)
(central SCLF)
SASAC, Qingdao People’s Government
(ultimate shareholder)
100%
Hisense Holdings Limited
(controlling shareholder)
(local SOE)
41.36%
Hisense Electric Co Ltd
(Stock code: 600060)
(local SCLF)
Central SOE/SCLF Local SOE/SCLF3 See Provisional Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Assets in State-owned Enterprises and Provisional Methods on
the Transfer of Assets in State-owned Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council in 2003.
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Although both central government and relevant local governments play the role of shareholders in all
SOEs, their actions and motivations are quite diﬀerent. The Research Centre of the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(2006) stated that the CGMs of central SOEs are better than those of local SOEs, because the largest share-
holders of the former do not have strong incentives to expropriate proﬁts and the central government, as the
ultimate shareholder, has implemented restrictions on the activities of the largest shareholders. However, it
has been reported that the largest shareholders of local SCLFs usually tunnel the listed ﬁrms to subsidise pub-
lic expenditure or provide retirement beneﬁts to ex-employees at the expense of other shareholders (e.g., see
the case studies on Northeast Electrical and Jiugui in Appendix A). It is well established that some SOEs
do not follow the rules and regulations.4 Appendix A presents the details of three Chinese listed ﬁrms with
respect to propping, tunnelling and business dependence among the largest shareholders (controlling party).
It is on this basis that the corporate performance of Chinese listed ﬁrms is materially manipulated.
Several scholars have investigated the association between CGMs and ﬁrm value in Chinese listed ﬁrms
(e.g., Chen, 2001; Bai et al., 2004; Wang and Xiao, 2009; Xia, 2008). However, these studies ignore the dom-
inant inﬂuence of SOEs in the capital market and thus mainly investigate the full population of Chinese listed
ﬁrms without deeply analysing the characteristics of the ultimate shareholders in these listed ﬁrms. Table 3
presents the percentage of ﬁrms in which the state is the ultimate controller in China in comparison with seven
other countries. It indicates that in most countries (except Singapore), SOEs amount to an insigniﬁcant pro-
portion of their respective capital markets, and in China, the percentage of SCLFs and non-SCLFs amount to
63.15% and 36.85%, respectively.
The above discussion leads us to consider the potential heterogeneous associations between CGMs and the
value of Chinese listed ﬁrms. However, Wang and Xiao (2009) claim that local governments have a strong
incentive to impose policies on the ﬁrms under their control. Chen and Zhu (2007) and the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (2006) further emphasise that central government and local governments manage their listed ﬁrms
diﬀerently. Hua and Liu (2009) argue that the central government has exercised tight control over central
SCLFs while local governments have higher motivation for both propping and tunnelling their listed ﬁrms
for the respective purposes of placement of new shares and expropriation. Chen and Zhu (2007) study Zhengz-
hou Yutong Bus Co., Ltd. (stock code: 600066) from 2001 to 2004 and note that its senior management and
local government (Zhengzhou City Government) cooperated to escape the control of central government and
tunnelled the listed ﬁrm. They also study Jiuqui Liquor Co Ltd (stock code: 000799) and note that the local
government (Xiangxi Autonomous Government) tunnelled the listed ﬁrm for social welfare in that region in
2003.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (2006) also claims that the CGMs of central SCLFs are better than those of
local SCLFs because central government, as the largest shareholder, does not have an incentive to expropriate
proﬁts, but imposes strict supervision on central SCLFs. In addition to Zhengzhou Yutong Bus, Chen and
Zhu (2007) also study Hunan Dongting Aquaculture Co., Ltd. (hereafter Dongting Aquaculture) (currently
known as Dahu Aquaculture Co., Ltd.; stock code: 600257) and explain that in the past, the number of IPOs
in each region was highly regulated by the central government through the adoption of a quota system for
raising funds in China. Chen and Zhu (2007) suspect that to obtain listing status in the Dongting Aquaculture
case, the local government colluded with the second largest shareholder to reorganise their businesses for the
IPO (kunbang shangshi5). After the IPO, the second large shareholder tunnelled about 17% of the IPO pro-
ceeds, totalling RMB57 million, from 2000 to 2002, but the largest and third largest shareholders did not.4 In October 2005, the Ministry of Finance issued a notice concerning the quality of listed ﬁrms. This notice required that (1) all advances
made by listed ﬁrms to their related parties had to be fully settled prior to 31 December 2006, and (2) RPTs must be fully disclosed to the
public. However, on 7 January 2007 the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission announced that 17 listed ﬁrms could not repay their
debts by the deadline. Of the 17 listed ﬁrms, ﬁve were SOEs, including Sanjiu, mentioned in Appendix A, with debt amounting to RMB 4.7
billion (51.4% of total outstanding debt).
5 Chen and Zhu (2007) describe bundled listing, or kunbang shangshi, as the merging of two or more businesses for the purpose of IPO,
and these businesses may be either independent or engaged in diﬀerent industries. The owners of these businesses, therefore, are the
promoters of the listed ﬁrm. Chen and Zhu (2007) further identify two main reasons for kunbang shangshi: (1) the listed ﬁrm can enlarge its
size before the IPO, thereby increasing the funds raised, and (2) local government can eﬀectively utilise each unit of the listing quota (listed
ﬁrms) that was assigned by the central government.
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tioned above, and from the case studies by Chen and Zhu (2007), whether the CGMs of these two types of
ﬁrms are similar or diﬀerent. The purpose of this paper is to investigate diﬀerences in the CGMs of central
and local SCLFs and the eﬀect of CGMs on ﬁrm value in these SCLFs. This paper examines ﬁnancial infor-
mation from 2007 to 2009, which reﬂects a more up-to-date situation in Chinese capital markets because in
2006 there was a signiﬁcant change in the institutional framework (including amendments to the Company
Law and Securities Law and a new Chinese Accounting System) and many Chinese listed ﬁrms completed
the share reform.2. Literature review
Jensen and Meckling (1976) examine the circumstances of contemporary listed ﬁrms and those with exter-
nal ﬁnancing and ﬁnd strong evidence for the separation of control and ownership. Fama and Jensen (1983)
also determine that eﬃcient control of agency problems is strongly aﬀected by the size and nature of the orga-
nization. In an empirical study, La Porta et al. (2002) ﬁnd that strong investor protection is associated with
eﬀective corporate governance, as reﬂected in valuable and broad ﬁnancial markets, the dispersed ownership
of shares and the eﬃcient allocation of capital across enterprises.
Further, Morey et al. (2009) show that improvement in corporate governance results in signiﬁcantly higher
valuations in emerging markets. A number of studies on Chinese listed ﬁrms also ﬁnd a positive association
between the levels of corporate governance and ﬁrm value (e.g., Chen et al., 2004a; Wei, 2007; Cheung et al.,
2010).2.1. Largest shareholder and corporate governance in China6
The presence of the largest shareholder can have both positive and negative eﬀects on ﬁrm value. If share-
holders are able to participate in corporate operations, they can monitor the actions of the directors and man-
agement of the ﬁrm – the monitoring eﬀect (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, in line with the increase in
ownership percentage, the largest shareholder can control and dominate the ﬁrm to become the controlling
shareholder, which results in the deviation of control rights from cash ﬂow rights (La Porta et al., 2002). A
number of studies have empirically demonstrated that large shareholders can extract private beneﬁts through
tunnelling (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; Gao et al., 2006).
In SCLFs the government acts in two conﬂicting roles, as both the largest shareholder and as a regulator.
Hence it is uncertain whether the state can eﬀectively enforce the law and monitor the fraudulent acts of large
shareholders, which are unfavourable to other shareholders (Bannerjee, 1997; Hart et al., 1997). Chen (2001)
further demonstrates that shares held by the state play a negative role in corporate governance, whereas
domestic institutional and managerial shareholdings improve the value of ﬁrms, based on ﬁrms in 1997.
Wang and Xiao (2009) ﬁnd that ﬁrm value increases when some control rights are decentralised from the
government to the SOE, and decentralization signiﬁcantly improves the performance of local government-
controlled ﬁrms but not central government-controlled ﬁrms, indicating that ﬁrm value is negatively related
to the extent of government control. Nevertheless, Xu and Wang (2006) demonstrate a signiﬁcant M-shaped
relationship between ownership of the largest shareholder and ﬁrm value. Li et al. (2004) and Chen et al.
(2004a) further demonstrate an inverse U-shaped relationship between the percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholders and the magnitude of tunnelling7 in Chinese listed ﬁrms. Bai et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
the higher the degree of concentration among other large shareholders, the higher the ﬁrm value, because6 It is commonly believed that the terms largest shareholder and controlling shareholder can be used interchangeably. However, Chinese
Law (2005) states that a controlling shareholder is one who holds more than 50% of the equity interests and/or voting rights of a company
(Article 217(2)). Similarly, a large shareholder who holds a very small amount of the voting rights cannot control the company (e.g.,
Minseng Bank). The authors cautiously consider the use of these two terms in this paper.
7 Tunnelling is deﬁned as the transfer of assets and/or proﬁts out of a ﬁrm for the beneﬁt of controlling shareholders (Johnson et al.,
2000). Many scholars have asserted that controlling shareholders treat listed ﬁrms as ‘sources of ﬁnance’ or ‘vehicles’ to obtain funds from
the public (e.g., Friedman et al., 2003; Bai et al., 2005).
N.W. Leung, M.-A. Cheng / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 89–112 95potential competition for corporate control and the constraints imposed by other shareholders on the largest
shareholder’s aspiration to tunnel are important determinants of ﬁrm value. However, Gao et al. (2006) dem-
onstrate that other major shareholders cannot prohibit tunnelling, whereas management and institutional
investors can.
2.2. Internal management structure
Internal management structure refers to the board of directors and top executives of listed ﬁrms. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe the agency relationship between the board of direc-
tors (agent) and shareholders (principal). Internal management structure has been found to have several eﬀects
on corporate performance as follows.
Board structure – The relationship between board size and ﬁrm value remains inconclusive. Peng and Luo
(2000) argue that Chinese ﬁrms with large boards are likely to beneﬁt from a wider range of views and external
connections, whereas Cho and Rui (2009) ﬁnd a negative relationship between board size and ﬁrm value. Fur-
ther, from an agency perspective, independent directors are expected to play a more active and eﬀective mon-
itoring role than executive directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Cho and Rui (2009) ﬁnd a positive relationship
between the proportion of independent directors on the board and ﬁrm value, whereas Bai et al. (2004) ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant association.
Separate role of CEO and chairman – Professional recommendations and some scholars (e.g., Bai et al.,
2004; Gao et al., 2006) consider that separation of the CEO and chairman of the board results in greater trans-
parency of corporate information, and therefore the improvement of internal CGMs.
Management incentives – The motivation and reward of top-level management seems to be a crucial factor
in the commercial success of ﬁrms and is something that is seen to be impeding the privatization of SOEs in
China. However, Gao et al. (2006) conclude that management shareholders could restrict the tunnelling of the
largest shareholders in Chinese listed ﬁrms. Buck et al. (2008) ﬁnd that in China, executive pay and ﬁrm per-
formance mutually aﬀect one another through reward and motivation. Typically, reward systems based on
economic performance are small in magnitude in China (Firth et al., 2008) and it is believed that such systems
do not motivate managers. However, Yang et al. (2009) point out that management remuneration is positively
associated with the corporate performance of Chinese listed ﬁrms from 2005 to 2007.
2.3. Corporate governance monitoring mechanisms
Corporate governance monitoring mechanisms (CGMMs) are an external form of CGMs, including the
legal and market environment. Zhang and Wang (2007) empirically demonstrate that the transparency of cor-
porations has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on investors’ actions and on stock prices.
Audit quality – Several studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Gul et al., 2010) ﬁnd that bigger audit ﬁrms with
higher reputations provide better audit quality, which results in improved corporate transparency and corpo-
rate governance.
Marketization – Gao et al. (2006) demonstrate that an increase in the transparency of corporate informa-
tion and the operation of listed ﬁrms in an open commodity market can restrict tunnelling. Enterprises in
developed regions8 have better corporate governance. Furthermore, Chan, Liu and Wang (2010) ﬁnd that
companies in institutionally weak regions that switch to a local auditor after receiving a qualiﬁed opinion suc-
ceed in opinion shopping. In developed regions, the government’s inﬂuence is lower than in other regions and
commodity and senior personnel markets are quite open (Fan et al., 2007). In contrast, Gao and Kling (2008)
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association between marketization and the magnitude of tunnelling. Nevertheless, several
case studies have shown that local governments use political issues to actively inﬂuence listed ﬁrms (see the
Wuliangye case in Appendix A).8 Gao and Kling (2008) consider Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong as the developed eastern coastal
region, which exhibits better governance structures.
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of their borrowers. However, Perotti and Thadden (2000) ﬁnd that lenders prefer less information dissemina-
tion, whereas shareholder-run ﬁrms prefer greater transparency. Therefore, it is uncertain whether investors
would perceive the increase in the magnitude of bank borrowings of Chinese listed ﬁrms as having a positive
or negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value.
Dual listing – Dual-listed ﬁrms are expected to exhibit higher corporate governance. Choi and Kim (2002)
state that the Korean Stock Exchange may supplement the enforcement of foreign exchange listing provisions
within Korea to increase the value to Korean investors of having a Korean ﬁrm select the protection provided
in foreign jurisdictions. Chen (2008) indicates that ﬁrms listed in a capital market with fuller information dis-
closure and stringent investor protection laws leads to more eﬀective corporate governance. As Chinese ﬁrms
can also be dual-listed as B-shares (listed in China for foreign investors) and H-shares (listed in Hong Kong),
these dual listing arrangements are assumed to improve the transparency of corporate information (Bai et al.,
2004).
2.4. Institutional isomorphism
Section 1.4 describes the Chinese government policy of zhuada fangxia on the governance of central and
local SCLFs. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) mention that rational actors make their organizations increasingly
similar as they try to change them. They further suggest three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change:
(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political inﬂuence and the problem of legitimacy, (2) mimetic iso-
morphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty and (3) normative isomorphism, associated with
professionalization. Therefore, it is suggested that the CGMs of central and local SCLFs are not similar to
each other because the eﬀect of the government’s zhuada fangxiao policy on their governance structures
may be diﬀerent.
3. Hypothesis development
3.1. Corporate governance mechanisms
Section 2 describes the potential eﬀect of CGMs on ﬁrm value. From the results of certain cases, together
with the zhuada fangxiao policy described in Section 1.4 and the principle of institutional isomorphism in Sec-
tion 2.4, it seems that the CGMs of central and local SCLFs are dissimilar, possibly because the same CGM
may have diﬀerent eﬀects on central and local SCLFs (e.g., ownership of the largest shareholder), and/or the
nature of the particular CGMs of these two categories diﬀer (e.g., the largest shareholder of a local SCLF may
tunnel the listed ﬁrm whereas central government may not). Accordingly, it is expected that there will be a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the eﬀect of CGMs on ﬁrm value in central and local SCLFs.
This paper classiﬁes ownership structure and internal management structure as internal CGMs, and corpo-
rate governance monitoring mechanisms as external CGMs. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is proposed:
H1. Central and local SCLFs diﬀer in their internal and external CGMs.Further, some previous studies (e.g., Morey et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2004a; Wei, 2007; Cheung et al., 2010)
ﬁnd a positive association between the level of corporate governance and ﬁrm value. As the CGMs of central
SCLFs may be diﬀerent from those of local ones (see Hypothesis 1 above), Hypothesis 2 is proposed:
H2. CGMs have diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁrm value in central and local SCLFs.Table 3
Percentage of ﬁrms with the state as the ultimate controller.
China HK UK Germany Japan France Singapore
State (%) 63.15 1.40 0.08 6.30 0.80 5.11 23.50
Non-state (%) 36.85 96.80 99.20 93.70 99.20 84.89 76.50
Extracted from Li and Zhang (2010).
Table 4
Variable descriptions.
TQ Tobin-Q value as a ratio of the market value of equity of a ﬁrm to the book value of its assets
TQ70 TQ x 70%
TQ80 TQ x 80%
Internal CGMs
TOPSHARE Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder
TOPSHARE2 Square of TOPSHARE
SHARE2_5 Aggregate percentage of shares held by the second to ﬁfth large shareholders
TOPEXE_SHARE Percentage of shares held by top executives (including directors)
TOPEXE_REMUN Percentage of total emoluments of top executives to total sales of the listed ﬁrm
lnBOD Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board
SEP_CAP Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairperson of the board and the CEO are two separate persons,
and 0 otherwise
External CGMs
BIG12 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the engaged auditor is one of the Big 12 audit ﬁrmsa, and 0 otherwise
DUAL_LIST Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the listed ﬁrm is also has B-shares or H-shares, and 0 otherwise
MI Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the listed ﬁrm is registered in the eastern coastal area (as deﬁned by
Gao and Kling, 2008), and 0 otherwise
GEARING Percentage of total bank and other loans to the total assets of the listed ﬁrm
Control variables
lnTA Natural logarithm of the total assets of the listed ﬁrm
ROA Proﬁt(loss) for the year/total assets at year end
FIXED_EFFECTS Dummy variables controlling for the ﬁxed eﬀects of calendar years and industries
a Previous foreign scholars have adoptedBig 4 and non-Big 4 auditors to proxy for high and lowquality, respectively (e.g., Chen et al., 2001;
Simunic andWu, 2009). Somedomestic scholars have adoptedBig 10 and non-Big 10 auditors (e.g., Lin et al., 2009; Lin andLiu, 2009). In this
paper, the authors adopt the ‘Big 12’ auditors as these are the ﬁrms that are eligible to act as reporting accountants and auditors for Chinese
incorporated ﬁrms listed in HongKong. The Big 12 auditors are BDOChina Shu Lun Pan, Tian Jian (Pan-China), BDOGuangdongDahua
Delu (Shenzhen), Shine Wing, Ernst & Young, Crowe Horwath, Grant Thornton Jingdu Tianhua, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte,
KPMG, RSMChina and Daxin. They have been allowed by the Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission to
conduct statutory audits onH-share listed ﬁrms sinceDecember 2010.Other thanGrant Thornton JingduTianhua andDaxin, the remaining
10 audit ﬁrms are those which are regarded by domestic scholars as a proxy for good audit quality.
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The regression model of this paper is shown in Eq. (1) and the variables are deﬁned in Table 4.9,109 Th
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compliTQðor TQ70;TQ80Þi;t ¼ b0 þ b1TOPSHAREi;t þ b2TOPSHARE2i;t þ b3SHARE2 5i;t
þ b4TOPEXE SHAREi; t þ b5TOPEXE REMUNi;t þ b6lnBODi;t
þ b7SEP CAPi;t þ b8BIG12i;t þ b9DUAL LISTi;t þ b10MIi;t
þ b11GEARINGi;t þ b12lnTAi;t þ b13ROAi;t þ ei;t ð1Þwhere e is the random error term of the model; i is the ith ﬁrm and t is the year.e authors follow the approach of Bai et al. (2004) in using three diﬀerent measures of ﬁrm value, namely TQ, TQ70 and TQ80, as the
ent variables because previously the non-tradable portion of Chinese listed ﬁrms had an average illiquidity discount of between 70%
% when they were traded in the informal market. TQ70 and TQ80 are used in the sensitivity tests.
e previous studies (e.g., Bai et al., 2004; Cho and Rui, 2009) include the proportion of outside (independent) directors as one of the
res of the eﬀectiveness of the board structure. The authors carefully considered that in current practice, there should be at least two
ndent directors on the board and at least one third of the board should be ﬁlled by independent directors in accordance with Article
e Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2001). In the pre-test, the proportion of independent directors on
ard showed a positive but non-signiﬁcant association with ﬁrm value, hence it is meaningless to merely include such a proportion as
the independent variables in this regression equation. The authors alternatively considered including a dummy variable to represent
ith a majority (at least half) of independent directors on the board, but note that only 13 (3%) and 53 (3.3%) ﬁrm-year observations
ral and local SCLFs, respectively, have a majority of independent directors on their board, representing an insigniﬁcant proportion
sample. Therefore, the authors concluded that in current practice, the proportion of independent directors on the board reﬂects
ance with the listing rules and is not a key corporate governance mechanism, and accordingly, this paper excludes it.
Table 5
Details of the sample.
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4.1. Data source and sample selection
Table 5 presents the details of the sample. Our sample period covers 3 years, from 2007 to 2009, and the
data was obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Data Base (CSMAR). There
Table 6.2
Descriptive statistics – Frequency of dummy variables.
Frequency of dummy variables
Central SCLFs (Panel A) Local SCLFs (Panel B) Total
No. % No. % No. %
SEP_CAP (equal to 1) 131 30.5 998 37.0 1290 35.7
BIG12 (equal to 1) 176 41.6 708 44.7 884 44.1
DUAL_LIST (equal to 1) 44 10.4 125 7.9 169 8.4
MI (equal to 1) 247 58.4 882 55.7 1129 56.3
Table 6.1
Descriptive statistics.
Number Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Central SCLFs (Panel A)
TQ 423 0.170 10.854 2.090 1.524
TQ70 423 0.120 7.590 1.463 1.067
TQ80 423 0.140 8.670 1.672 1.219
TOPSHARE 423 0.080 0.860 0.374 0.158
TOPSHARE2 423 0.010 0.740 0.164 0.131
SHARE2_5 423 0.010 0.610 0.148 0.116
TOPEXE_SHARE 423 0.000 0.190 0.002 0.016
TOPEXE_REMUN 423 0.000 0.520 0.047 0.073
lnBOD 423 1.610 2.710 2.189 0.212
SEP_CAP 423 0.000 1.000 0.305 0.461
BIG12 423 0.000 1.000 0.416 0.493
DUAL_LIST 423 0.000 1.000 0.104 0.306
MI 423 0.000 1.000 0.584 0.493
GEARING 423 0.000 0.660 0.193 0.143
lnTA 423 18.830 28.000 21.790 1.372
ROA 423 0.000 0.390 0.053 0.050
Local SCLFs (Panel B)
TQ 1583 0.180 252.910 2.401 6.879
TQ70 1583 0.130 177.040 1.681 4.816
TQ80 1583 0.140 202.330 1.921 5.504
TOPSHARE 1583 0.010 0.850 0.364 0.151
TOPSHARE2 1583 0.000 0.720 0.156 0.122
SHARE2_5 1583 0.010 0.560 0.149 0.112
TOPEXE_SHARE 1583 0.000 0.540 0.006 0.036
TOPEXE_REMUN 1583 0.000 0.780 0.049 0.079
lnBOD 1583 0.690 2.890 2.210 0.210
SEP_CAP 1583 0.000 1.000 0.370 0.483
BIG12 1583 0.000 1.000 0.447 0.497
DUAL_LIST 1583 0.000 1.000 0.079 0.270
MI 1583 0.000 1.000 0.557 0.497
GEARING 1583 0.000 1.310 0.203 0.148
lnTA 1583 15.420 27.490 21.677 1.173
ROA 1583 0.000 2.340 0.055 0.090
100 N.W. Leung, M.-A. Cheng / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 89–112are 4913 ﬁrm-year observations for these 3 years, of which 85 observations from the ﬁnancial sector11 and
1201 observations with missing variables are excluded. A further 186 observations under ST status12 and
18 observations that failed to announce their annual reports by the following 30 April are also excluded.
Our ﬁnal sample contains 3423 ﬁrm-year observations, representing 423 central SCLFs, 1583 local SCLFs
and 1417 non-SCLFs, respectively.11 The authors adopted the general academic practice of eliminating ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms (Industry Code I).
12 Firms that failed to comply with the relevant law and regulations to release their annual reports on time and those under special
treatment (ST) are removed to reduce bias.
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Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The means of TQ, the dependent variable, are
2.09 in Panel A and 2.40 in Panel B, respectively, indicating that ﬁrm value for central SCLFs (Panel A) is, in
general, lower than that of local SCLFs (Panel B) during these 3 years. The means of TOPSHARE are approx-
imately 37.4% in Panel A and 36.4% in Panel B, while those of SHARE2_5 are approximately 14.8% and
14.9% in Panels A and B. The ownership structures of these two panels are similar to those of Chinese listed
ﬁrms before the share reform and it is likely that the largest shareholders are rarely challenged by other share-
holders on important issues (La Porta et al., 2002). The mean of TOPEXE_SHARE in Panel B is 0.6%, higher
than the 0.2% in Panel A, indicating that the top executives of local SCLFs are more motivated than those of
central SCLFs. TOPEXE_SHARE in local SCLFs is higher than that in central SCLFs, possibly because own-
ership by the top executives of large SOEs (mostly central SCLFs) was not previously permitted.13 Overall,
however, the average percentages of shares held by directors is still very low in both groups. TOPEX-
E_REMUN in Panel B is 4.9%, slightly higher than the 4.7% in Panel A, indicating that in both central
and local SCLFs, the remuneration of top executives is related to ﬁrm size (turnover). The means of lnTA
are 21.790 in Panel A and 21.677 in Panel B, indicating that in our sample the ﬁrm size of central SCLFs
is generally higher than that of local SCLFs. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the means of the
other variables in these two panels.
Table 6.2 reports the frequencies of the dummy variables. For SEP_CAP, the frequency is 30.5% in Panel A
and 37.0% in Panel B, indicating that the chairperson of the board and the CEO are separate people in less
than 40% of the SCLFs, even though it is professionally recommended that these two roles should be held by
diﬀerent people. For BIG12, the frequency is 41.6% in Panel A and 44.7% in Panel B, indicating that less than
half of the listed SCLFs engage Big 12 auditors, possibly because non-Big 12 auditors are more familiar with
Chinese listed ﬁrms. For DUAL_LIST, the frequency is 10.4% in Panel A and 7.9% in Panel B, indicating that
central SCLFs also intend to raise funds from foreign investors and, from the records of the Stock Exchange
of Hong Kong, the giant H-share companies are also listed as A-shares in China (e.g., Big 4 banks and the
giant telecommunication service providers). For MI, the frequency is 58.4% in Panel A and 55.7% in Panel
B, indicating that slightly more than half of the listed SCLFs are registered in the eastern coastal (more devel-
oped) region.
Table 7 reports correlation coeﬃcients. The statistics in Panel A show signiﬁcant positive correlations
between TQ and TOPEXE_SHARE and ROA, but negative correlations between TQ and lnBOD, GEAR-
ING and lnTA. The statistics in Panel B show signiﬁcant positive correlations between TQ and TOPEX-
E_REMUN and ROA, but signiﬁcant negative correlations between TQ and TOPSHARE and lnTA. The
correlation coeﬃcients between the independent variables are generally low, indicating that multicollinearity
is unlikely to be a serious problem in the interpretation of the results.144.3. Comparison of ﬁrm value and corporate governance mechanisms
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide some preliminary signs that ﬁrm value and CGMs do diﬀer between central and
local SCLFs. A one-way ANOVA was run to investigate whether the above mean results for ﬁrm value and
CGMs are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent among central, local and non-SCLFs. The ANOVA results presented in
Table 8 suggest that TOPSHARE, TOPEXE_SHARE, lnBOD, SEP_CAP and GEARING are the key diﬀer-
ences between the CGMs of central, local and non-SCLFs. These results provide further support to our initial
claim that the CGMs of central and local SCLFs diﬀer.13 The ownership of top executives in large SOEs has been permitted in accordance with ‘Provisional Regulations on state-owned
property rights transfer to management’, promulgated by SASAC of State Council on 11 April 2005.
14 The natural logarithm of the total sales of Chinese listed ﬁrms (lnSALES) was also considered as a control variable for the ﬁrm size of
these listed ﬁrms. As the correlation coeﬃcient between lnSALES and lnTA is extremely high (0.856 at the 1% signiﬁcance level) in pre-
testing, we selected lnTA only as a control variable for business size.
Table 7
Correlations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Central SCLFs (Panel A)
TQ (1) 1
TQ70 (2) 1.000** 1
TQ80 (3) 1.000** 1.000** 1
TOPSHARE (4) 0.460 0.046 0.046 1
TOPSHARE2 (5) 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.972** 1
SHARE2_5 (6) 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.337** 0.339** 1
TOPEXE_SHARE (7) 0.128** 0.128** 0.128 0.084 0.770 0.100* 1
TOPEXE_REMUN (8) 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.077 0.950 0.075 0.030 1
lnBOD (9) 0.164** 0.164** 0.164** 0.000 0.003 0.187** 0.060 0.105* 1
SEP_CAP (10) 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.107* 0.087 0.027 0.090 0.068 0.125* 1
BIG12 (11) 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.081 0.109* 0.104* 0.058 0.079 0.190** 0.028 1
DUAL_LIST (12) 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.099* 0.142** 0.131** 0.460 0.106* 0.197** 0.091 0.199** 1
MI (13) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.094 0.106* 0.066 0.115* 0.008 0.010 0.111* 0.148** 0.146** 1
GEARING (14) 0.338** 0.338** 0.338** 0.045 0.039 0.049 0.059 0.070 0.098* 0.009 0.057 0.020 0.044 1
lnTA (15) 0.449** 0.449** 0.449** 0.283** 0.343** 0.063 0.094 0.347** 0.323** 0.081 0.312** 0.412** 0.104* 0.205** 1
ROA 0.464** 0.464** 0.464** 0.051 0.070 0.101* 0.189** 0.352** 0.016 0.006 0.101* 0.052 0.058 0.356** .0038
Local SCLFs (Panel B)
TQ (1) 1
TQ70 (2) 1.000** 1
TQ80 (3) 1.000** 1.000** 1
TOPSHARE (4) 0.074** 0.074** 0.074** 1
TOPSHARE2 (5) 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.975** 1
SHARE2_5 (6) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.334** 0.349** 1
TOPEXE_SHARE (7) 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.071** 0.074** 0.197** 1
TOPEXE_REMUN (8) 0.075** 0.075** 0.075** 0.179** 0.182** 0.013 0.002 1
lnBOD (9) 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.016 0.045 0.049 0.039 1
SEP_CAP (10) 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.082** 0.071** 0.056* 0.137** 0.002 0.100** 1
BIG12 (11) 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.117** 0.121** 0.027 0.011 0.029 0.044 0.017 1
DUAL_LIST (12) 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.034 0.039 0.146** 0.049 0.030 0.113** 0.074** 0.118** 1
MI (13) 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.025 0.027 0.119** 0.036 0.057* 0.078** 0.058* 0.116** 0.110** 1
GEARING (14) 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.041 0.043 0.088** 0.083** 0.029 0.087** 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.093** 1
lnTA (15) 0.261** 0.261** 0.261** 0.277** 0.300** 0.105** 0.084** 0.315** 0.285** 0.065** 0.146** 0.282** 0.034 0.171** 1
ROA 0.455** 0.455** 0.455** 0.023 0.017 0.067** 0.057* 0.190** 0.000 0.046 0.074** 0.000 0.068** 0.035 0.132**
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed);
** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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Table 8
ANOVA of variables by central, local and non-SCLFs.
Sample ﬁrms are classiﬁed into three groups: (1) central SCLFs, (2) local SCLFs and (3) non-SCLFs.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two tailed).
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two tailed).
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two tailed).
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Table 9
Regression results: corporate governance mechanisms and ﬁrm value in central SCLFs.
Note: P-values are in parentheses.
 Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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This section reports the results of the multiple regression analysis with respect to the two hypotheses. The
results are shown in Tables 9–11.
According to Berman (2007), the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) values of variables that do not exhibit mul-
ticollinearity are usually between 1.0 and 2.0.15 The collinearity test results show that none of the independent
variables in this paper have a VIF of over 2 (not tabulated). According to these results and the correlation
analysis of these variables shown in Table 7, multicollinearity is not considered to be a problem for either
model.4.4.1. Central SCLFs
Table 9 reports the regression results for central SCLFs. TOPSHARE is negatively related to TQ, but the
association is not signiﬁcant. However, TOPSHARE2 is positively related to TQ at the 1% signiﬁcance level,15 Only TOPSHARE and TOPSHARE2 exhibit high correlations with one another in all regressions.
Table 10
Regression results: corporate governance mechanisms and ﬁrm value in local SCLFs.
Note: P-values are in parentheses.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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relationship between ﬁrm value and ownership, as expected. SHARE2_5 is positively related to TQ at the 1%
signiﬁcance level, indicating that the higher the degree of ownership concentration among other large share-
holders, the higher the ﬁrm value. These two associations are consistent with Bai et al. (2004). DUAL_LIST is
also positively related to TQ at the 1% signiﬁcance level, implying that investors prefer dual-listed ﬁrms, pos-
sibly because these ﬁrms are required to provide detailed information to foreign investors and/or foreign stock
exchanges. This positive association is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Bai et al. (2004). lnTA is negatively
related to TQ, indicating that the value of larger central SCLFs decreases as ﬁrm size increases, and this neg-
ative association is consistent with the ﬁndings of Bai et al. (2004) and Wang and Xiao (2009). ROA is pos-
itively related to TQ at the 1% signiﬁcance level, indicating that ﬁrm value increases in line with proﬁtability.
Overall, the eﬀect of other CGMs on ﬁrm value is not signiﬁcant.
Sensitivity tests were performed using Eq. (1). The regression equation was rerun by (1) eliminating TOP-
SHARE and TOPSHARE2 and (2) replacing TQ with TQ70 and TQ80, respectively. The results show that the
directions and signiﬁcance of the associations between other tested variables remain the same.
Table 11
Comparison of regression results: corporate governance mechanisms and ﬁrm value in four types of Chinese listed ﬁrms.
TQ
Expectedsign Central SCLFs (Panel A) Local SCLFs (Panel B) Non-SCLFs (Panel C) Whole sample (Panel D)
TOPSHARE ? 2.390 15.308*** 1.896** 8.702***
(0.120) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000)
TOPSHARE2 ? 3.911** 18.910*** 2.900*** 10.840***
(0.041) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
SHARE2_5 ? 1.613*** 2.214 0.610** 0.880
(0.003) (0.140) (0.025) (0.215)
TOPEXE_SHARE + 0.517 2.463 0.306 1.077
(0.879) (0.571) (0.553) (0.529)
TOPEXE_REMUN + 0.885 7.218*** 1.010*** 5.244***
(0.306) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000)
lnBOD + 0.359 1.099 0.049 0.388
(0.203) (0.151) (0.724) (0.286)
SEP_CAP + 0.111 0.470 0.055 0.490
(0.369) (0.886) (0.384) (0.760)
BIG12 + 0.060 0.326 0.086 0.193
(0.609) (0.295) (0.243) (0.196)
DUAL_LIST + 0.853*** 1.243** 0.391*** 0.974***
(0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000)
MI + 0.076 0.009 0.028 0.022
(0.518) (0.978) (0.630) (0.882)
GEARING ? 0.533 0.927 1.244*** 0.794
(0.226) (0.396) (0.000) (0.131)
lnTA – 0.580*** 1.341*** 0.508*** 0.918***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA + 12.616*** 32.129*** 15.131*** 30.331***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FIXED_EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant ? 14.597*** 29.840*** 12.971*** 21.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adj-R2 0.499 0.266 0.510 0.259
F-stat. 17.172 23.002 57.654 46.901
OBS 423 1583 1417 3423
Note: P-values are in parentheses.
 Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
106 N.W. Leung, M.-A. Cheng / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 89–1124.4.2. Local SCLFs
Table 10 reports the regression results for local SCLFs. TOPSHARE is negatively related to TQ, whereas
TOPSHARE2 is positively related to TQ, at the 1% signiﬁcance level, consistent with Bai et al. (2004), Chen
et al. (2004a) and Li et al. (2004) and also consistent with the results for central SCLFs. SHARE2_5 is pos-
itively related to TQ, but not signiﬁcantly, indicating that unlike in central SCLFs, the aggregate of other large
shareholders cannot countercheck the acts of the largest shareholder, possibly because there is a potential
threat that the second or even the third largest shareholder can collude with the largest shareholder for their
own beneﬁt, at the expense of other shareholders (see the Hunan Dongting Aquaculture case study in Sec-
tion 1.2.4). TOPEXE_REMUN is positively related to TQ at the 1% signiﬁcance level, indicating that the
remuneration of top executives increases in line with ﬁrm value, consistent with Buck et al. (2008) and Yang
et al. (2009). DUAL_LIST is positively related to TQ at the 5% signiﬁcance level, consistent with the results
for central SCLFs. lnTA and ROA, respectively, are negatively and positively related to TQ at the 1% signif-
icance level, consistent with the results for central SCLFs. The eﬀect of other CGMs on ﬁrm value is not
signiﬁcant.
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TOPSHARE and TOPSHARE2 and (2) replacing TQ with TQ70 and TQ80. The results show that the direc-
tions and signiﬁcance of the associations between other tested variables remain the same.4.5. Additional tests
4.5.1. Comparison with non-SCLFs and full sample
Eq. (1) was also rerun for (1) non-SCLFs (Panel C) and (2) the full sample (Panel D). Table 11 summarises
the regression results of these four panels. TOPSHARE is negatively related to TQ in all panels, but is signif-
icant only in Panels B, C and D. In contrast, TOPSHARE2 is positively related to TQ in all panels at the 1–5%
signiﬁcance levels, implying that there is a non-linear relationship between TOPSHARE and TQ in the full
sample and in particular panels, consistent with the ﬁndings of Bai et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2004a,b) and
Li et al. (2004). SHARE2_5 is positively related to TQ in central and non-SCLFs at the 1–5% signiﬁcance lev-
els, but not in local SCLFs. TOPEXE_REMUN is positively related to TQ in all panels, and at the 1% sig-
niﬁcance level in Panels B, C and D, consistent with the ﬁndings of Buck et al. (2008) and Yang et al.
(2009), possibly because the remuneration of top executives of local and non-SCLFs is linked to corporate
performance, whereas the top executives of central SCLFs are politically appointed and thus their remuner-
ation is not linked to corporate performance. DUAL_LIST is positively related to TQ in all panels at the 1–5%
signiﬁcance levels, consistent with the ﬁndings of Bai et al. (2004). In general, TQ is not signiﬁcantly related to
any CGMM except DUAL_LIST, in all panels, possibly because Chinese listed ﬁrms are strongly aﬀected by
their largest shareholders and top executives and these insiders are rarely challenged by auditors (BIG10) or
money lenders (GEARING). The directions and signiﬁcance of the associations between TQ and lnTA and
ROA remain unchanged in all panels.4.5.2. Sensitivity tests: Elimination of company data in 2008, dual-listed ﬁrms and separation of manufacturing
and non-manufacturing ﬁrms
Two sensitivity tests were performed. First, because of the unusual drop in the share prices of Chinese listed
ﬁrms in 2008 caused by the ﬁnancial tsunami,16 the Tobin-Q value might include the eﬀect of market volatility.
The authors considered this non-corporate governance eﬀect on ﬁrm value by including year dummies and
lnTA and ROA as control variables in the regression equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)). Eq. (1) was also rerun after
excluding the 2008 company data.
Second, because the CGMs of dual-listed ﬁrms (especially those listed in Hong Kong) are better than
those of non-dual-listed ﬁrms (e.g., Bai et al., 2004), the inclusion of dual-listed ﬁrms in the sample may
provide a biased association between CGMs and ﬁrm value. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5, manufac-
turing ﬁrms (Sector C) amounted to over 50% of the full sample. Most of these ﬁrms were spun oﬀ from
their largest shareholders before their IPOs and their businesses are still closely connected to their largest
shareholders (or controlling party), as mentioned in the Wuliangye case, and their CGMs are likely to diﬀer
from those of non-manufacturing ﬁrms. Accordingly, additional tests were conducted on (1) the sample
without dual-listed ﬁrms, (2) the sample without manufacturing ﬁrms and (3) the sample with manufactur-
ing ﬁrms only.
The results of these two sensitivity tests (not tabulated) further support that SHARE2_5 and TOPEX-
E_REMUN exhibit diﬀerent eﬀects in central and local SCLFs. The directions and signiﬁcance of other asso-
ciations with CGMs remain unchanged.4.6. Endogenous eﬀect of ﬁrm value on ownership of the largest shareholder
Chen et al. (2004b) suggest that ownership structure is determined by the trade-oﬀ of many factors, includ-
ing ﬁrm value, and ﬁrm value is likely to aﬀect ownership structure. To examine the potential endogenous16 The market index, HuShen 300, on 30 April 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 was 3478.93, 3793.87, 2604.45 and 3014.07, respectively.
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dependent variables and TQ the independent variable. Eq. (2) is formulated as follows:TOPSHAREðor TOPSHARE2Þi;t ¼ b0 þ b1TQi;t þ b2TOPEXE SHAREi;t
þ b3TOPEXE REMUNi;t þ b4lnBODi;t þ b5SEP CAPi;t
þ b6BIG12i;t þ b7DUAL LISTi;t þ b8MIi;t þ b9GEARINGi;t
þ b10lnTAi;t þ b11ROAi;t þ ei;t ð2ÞThe results of this regression for both central and local SCLFs (not tabulated) conﬁrm that there is no
signiﬁcant endogenous eﬀect of ﬁrm performance on ownership of the largest shareholder, as both TQ and
ROA are insigniﬁcantly associated with TOPSHARE in all panels. This result is consistent with Hess et al.
(2010), who ﬁnd no endogenous eﬀect of ﬁrm value on the aggregate of ownership of the largest ﬁve share-
holders. Eq. (2) was rerun by using TOPSHARE2 as the dependent variable, and the regression results again
show that there is no endogenous eﬀect of ﬁrm value on ownership of the largest shareholder in central and
local SCLFs.4.7. Summary of regression results
Overall, SHARE2_5 and TOPEXE_REMUN are diﬀerent CGMs in central and local SCLFs.
SHARE2_5 is signiﬁcantly and positively related to TQ in central SCLFs, but not in local SCLFs. This
result may help to explain the inconsistent ﬁndings of Bai et al. (2004) and Gao et al. (2006) mentioned
in Section 2.1, possibly because in central SCLFs other large shareholders can eﬀectively monitor the largest
shareholders, whereas in local SCLFs the largest shareholder is likely to collude with the second largest
shareholder to extract funds from Chinese listed ﬁrms, as proposed by Chen and Zhu (2007). TOPEX-
E_REMUN is signiﬁcantly and positively related to TQ in local SCLFs, but not in central SCLFs, implying
that local SCLFs employ professional managers to operate their businesses, and their compensation and
tenure is strongly linked to ﬁrm performance (value), in contrast to the politically employed mangers in cen-
tral SCLFs. Another indicator of management incentive, TOPEXE_SHARE is insigniﬁcantly related to TQ,
possibly because it is very low in both central and local SCLFs, as mentioned in Section 4.2. Accordingly,
both H1 and H2 are supported.5. Conclusion
Some scholars describe the current government policy as zhuada fangxiao, in which central SOEs are sub-
ject to a ‘grasp the large’ (zhuada) scheme and local SOEs to a ‘release the small’ (fangxiao) scheme, whereby
the state owner retains control. Based on company data from 2007 to 2009, this paper provides empirical evi-
dence that the diﬀerent characteristics of ultimate shareholders may lead to heterogeneous eﬀects of CGMs on
ﬁrm value. The results suggest that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration
of top executives exhibit diﬀerent eﬀects on the value of central and local SCLFs. The ﬁndings also suggest a
possible non-linear relationship between the ownership of the largest shareholder and ﬁrm value in all SCLFs,
perhaps because the ultimate shareholder has a strong incentive to support and tunnel the listed ﬁrm for its
own political beneﬁts, and the largest shareholder seeks beneﬁts at the expense of other shareholders. Further-
more, in many cases the local government may even collude with other large shareholders. This paper also
provides evidence that there is no endogenous eﬀect between the ownership of the largest shareholder and ﬁrm
value in central and local SCLFs.Acknowledgements
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Appendix A
A.1. Case studies on state-controlled listed ﬁrms
In China, there are statutory regulations and recommendations to regulate and restrict related-party trans-
actions between the largest shareholders and their listed ﬁrms (e.g., Article 21 of Company Law (2005), Para-
graphs 12–21 of the Code of Best Practice and Certain Opinions on Regulating the Behaviour of State-owned
Shareholders of Listed Firms (2009)). However, in some state-controlled listed ﬁrms, the largest shareholders
tunnel and use the funds to pay for the pensions and welfare of past employees (e.g., Northeast Electrical from
1999 to 2001, H-share Stock code: 0042, A-share Stock code: 000585), to support the expenditure of local gov-
ernments (e.g., Jiugui Liquor from 1998 to 2005, Stock code: 000799) and to support their own business
expansion (e.g., Sanjiu).
Cases One and Two illustrate the common practice in China of the largest shareholders propping up the
listed ﬁrms before the IPO, and then tunnelling them after the IPO. Case Three presents another common
example of the integration of the controlling party and the listed ﬁrm into a single economic entity.
A.1.1. Case One – Agricultural Bank of China (central SCLF): a case of propping up before the IPO
The Agricultural Bank of China Limited (hereafter ‘ABC’) is one of the big four commercial banks in
China. Its shares have been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (A-share Stock code 601288) and the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange (H-share Stock code 1288) since 2010. The percentage of state-owned shares has chan-
ged from 100% ownership by the Ministry of Finance and Central Huijin Investment Co Ltd, both under the
State Council, to 96.3% (before the IPO) and to 82.7% at the end of 2010 (after the IPO). Its prospectus (H
shares) shows that in 2008, before its corporate restructuring, ABC disposed of certain non-performing assets
worth RMB815695 million, including non-performing loans of RMB766768 million and other impaired assets
of RMB48927 million. From the total of RMB815695 million, the People’s Bank of China and the Ministry of
Finance carried RMB150602 million and RMB665093 million, respectively. If those transactions had not been
undertaken in 2008, the total equity of ABC as at 31 December 2009 would have been reduced to RMB760665
by the reporting accountants and auditors, and its ﬁnancial position over the period, including the corporate
restructuring, would have been as follows.2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
RMB
MillionRMB
MillionRMB
MillionRMB
MillionRMB
MillionReported comprehensive income (after non-
controlling interest) (‘CI’) *35,146 76,400 52,374 87,762 251,682Pro-forma CI without corporate restructure 35,146 (684,265) 52,374 87,762 (508,983)Reported total equity (after non-controlling
interest) (‘TE’)(727,605) 290,445 342,819 542,071Pro-forma TE without corporate restructure* (727,605) (470,220) (417,846) (218,594)Source: H-share prospectus and 2010 annual report of ABC.
* It is assumed that in 2008 the reversal of impairment loss on the loan receivables of RMB 43.1 billion would have not been made and the
additional balance of doubtful loan receivables of RMB 717.6 billion would have been made, resulting in the decrease of proﬁt for that
year and a reduction in the accumulated equity by a total of RMB 760.7 billion.
With the above pro-forma adjustments, ABC would not have met the listing qualiﬁcations in Hong Kong
and China, as it had incurred a loss in recent years and had negative equity. The above corporate restructuring
was, in fact, propping from the central government (the ultimate shareholder) to ABC to enable it to meet the
listing qualiﬁcations.
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viously, due to political pressure, the state-owned banks always granted loans and advances to other ineﬃcient
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), even when they were unproﬁtable and insolvent, resulting in an accumulation
of non-performing loans. Although the central government got rid of a material part of the non-performing
loans from ABC’s books in 2008, it is uncertain whether political inﬂuence would make ABC support other
SOEs in future economic slowdowns.
A.1.2. Case Two – Sanjiu (central SCLF): a case of tunnelling
The China Resources Sanjiu Medical and Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (formerly known as Sanjiu Medical and
Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (Sanjiu)) has been listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Stock code: 000999) since
2000 and is engaged in the production and sale of pharmaceutical products in China. On 31 December 2007,
Sanjiu Enterprise Group Co Ltd was the controlling shareholder of Sanjiu with a total of 71.4% of the shares.
After the IPO in 2000, the controlling shareholder embezzled funds from Sanjiu, and this was reported in
the mass media as an attempt by the controlling shareholder to raise funds for the repayment of existing
loans.17 As a result, in October 2005 the Ministry of Finance issued a notice concerning the quality of listed
ﬁrms, the ‘Notice of the State Council on Approving and Forwarding the Opinions of China Securities Regulatory
Commission on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies’. This notice required that all advances made by
listed ﬁrms to their related parties had to be settled in full before 31 December 2006. The controlling share-
holder did not comply with this notice, and on 31 December 2007 it owed RMB 3.7 billion to Sanjiu, repre-
senting 48.2% of the net assets of the ﬁrm. The mass media reported that the controlling shareholder extracted
funds from Sanjiu to acquire new businesses that were unrelated to Sanjiu.18 In 2008, the controlling share-
holder transferred the shares of Sanjiu to New Sanjiu Holdings Co Ltd (wholly owned by China Resources
(Group) Co Ltd, which is supervised by the State Council) and fully repaid the amount due to Sanjiu.19
A.1.3. Case Three – Wuliangye (local SCLF): a case of the integration of business operations with its controlling
party
Wuliangye Yibin Company Limited is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Stock code: 000858).
Wuliangye and its subsidiaries are engaged in the sale and manufacture of wine under the name of
‘Wuliangye’, in Yibin, Sichuan, China. Although it is held under the name of the local government agency,
Yibin State-owned Assets Management Co Ltd (the controlling shareholder), the ﬁrm is actually under the
control of another state-owned enterprise, the Wuliangye Group Co Ltd (the controlling party) as evidenced
by
1. the oﬃcial website, www.wuliangye.com.cn, where the ﬁrm appears to be part of the controlling party; and
2. the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements, which disclose a series of related party transactions (RPTs) between the ﬁrm
and the controlling party.
Although a series of regular and irregular RPTs were conducted between the ﬁrm and the Wuliangye
Group, Wuliangye is a proﬁtable business, unlike other ﬁrms that were bankrupted, delisted or taken over
after being tunnelled by their controlling shareholders. Liu et al. (2004) estimate that the Wuliangye Group
yielded private beneﬁts of RMB9.7 billion between 1998 and 2003. Nevertheless, its ﬁnancial statements
and oﬃcial website show that
1. the ﬁrm has rarely paid a cash dividend, even though it has been proﬁtable since the IPO in 1998 and it
possesses a huge amount of cash and cash equivalents; and
2. the ﬁrm and the Wuliangye Group are integral parts of the same supply chain, as evidenced by the RPTs;
both Wuliangye and the Wuliangye Group sell products with the same brand name.17 For example, see the news from Sina Finance, http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/roll/20040811/0607939595.shtml, accessed on 20 October
2011.
18 See ‘999 Group’, http://wiki.mbalib.com/, accessed on 29 September 2011.
19 It is thought that the controlling shareholder sold the Sanjiu shares for cash and used the same funds to repay the debt due to Sanjiu.
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the magnitude of the RPTs (i.e., the possibility of tunnelling and earnings management) and to ensure the
independence of their management hierarchy and business models from their related parties. Following this
professional practice, in 2009 Wuliangye announced its proposal for corporate reorganization to separate
the core business from the Wuliangye Group and dispose of the non-business related investments to its con-
trolling shareholder to improve investors’ perceptions of corporate governance.
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